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THE PRESSURE IS ON-CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL
STRATEGIES AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
BILL ONG HING'
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's message to criminal defense attorneys in Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky was clear: W when there is a risk of deportation, de-
fense counsel has a constitutional duty to inform an immigrant defendant
of the potential for deportation or adverse immigration consequences
prior to pleading guilty. In my view, this constitutional duty places tre-
mendous pressure on defense counsel to do more than advise, because
once advised, the client very naturally may want to know what options
are available other than going to trial. Rather than simply focusing on
how to minimize the time of incarceration for the client under a particu-
lar plea agreement, competent counsel has to figure out how to minimize
the immigration ramifications. As I discuss in this Article, the efforts
range from determining whether the client might actually be a citizen, to
seeking a sentence that would fall outside the realm of an aggravated
felony, to seeking a plea to an alternative charge that does not involve
moral turpitude or firearms, to making sure that the sentencing plea or
colloquy is silent about certain facts.
These efforts are demanding. They entail resourceful, intricate
knowledge of the relevant criminal codes. They also require resourceful,
intricate knowledge of the criminal grounds of removal and up-to-date
research on what classifications of convictions can or cannot lead to re-
moval.
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INTRODUCTION
In Padilla v. Kentucky,' the Supreme Court made clear that criminal
defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to inform immigrant defend-
ants of the potential for deportation prior to pleading guilty. When a par-
ticular plea "may carry a risk" of deportation, the defense attorney must
at the very least advise a "noncitizen client that pending criminal charg-
es" might lead to "adverse immigration consequences."2 "[W]hen the
deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct ad-
*3vice" is clear.
In Padilla, Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on
counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor trailer without a weight and
distance-tax number.4 On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea
with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the
final charge.5 He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing
that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a conse-
quence of his guilty plea.6 Mr. Padilla claimed that his counsel "not only
failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but
also told him that he 'did not have to worry about immigration status
since he had been in the country so long.' 7 Mr. Padilla had been a law-
ful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years.
Relying on this erroneous advice, he pleaded guilty to the drug charges,
making his deportation "virtually mandatory."9 But for this bad advice,
1. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Id. at 369.
3. Id.
4. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev'd, Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
5. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
6. Id.
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Mr. Padilla alleged that he would have gone to trial instead of pleading
guilty. o
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court recognized that after
amendments to the immigration laws in 1996, "removal is practically
inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable
discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for nonciti-
zens convicted of particular classes of offenses."" As such,
[t]hese changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accu-
rate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been
more important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of
federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the
most important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on nonciti-
zen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.'
2
The Padilla case thus underscores the absolute duty that criminal
defense attorneys have to advise their noncitizen clients of the potential
collateral immigration consequences. However, once that duty has been
discharged, then what? Mr. Padilla alleged that had he known about the
potential deportation consequences of his guilty plea, he would have
gone to trial. That option is clear, but was that his only option? A trial
could have resulted in a similar outcome, namely, a conviction of the
three drug charges. Or the outcome could have been worse. He could
have received a greater sentence on the drug charges than what he had
plea bargained for, or he could have been convicted of additional charg-
es. Any of those outcomes also would have led to deportation.
What if Mr. Padilla's counsel had actually informed Mr. Padilla, "If
you plead guilty to these three charges, you will be subject to deporta-
tion," and Mr. Padilla responded, "What are my options to avoid deporta-
tion; or what can you do to help me avoid deportation?" Yes, a trial for
Mr. Padilla could have resulted in an acquittal thus avoiding the deporta-
tion consequence. However, the holding in the Padilla case is not simply
about giving the informed, noncitizen criminal defendant the opportunity
to go to trial. In my view, the pressure is on. The holding in Padilla in-
vites competent counsel to engage in, or at least consider, a potential
panoply of strategies and options to avoid collateral immigration conse-
quences for the noncitizen client. Thus, the goal is not simply about min-
imizing time in jail-the standard strategy that defense counsel might
otherwise be focused on.
In this Article, I discuss a list of options and approaches that compe-
tent criminal defense attorneys might consider in cases where their
I0. Id.
I1. Id. at 363-64.
12. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
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noncitizen clients are charged with crimes that could render the clients
removable. This could mean working with an immigration law specialist
because "[i]mmigration law can be complex, and . . . a legal specialty of
its own"; 3 its provisions are notoriously complicated and continually
changing-comparable to the "labyrinth" of the Internal Revenue
Code.14 It could mean working on a plea deal that involves pleading to a
crime that is not a deportable offense. Or it could also mean looking for
flexible avenues within the criminal justice system, such as seeking di-
version or a restorative justice approach that might result in charges be-
ing dismissed. In light of Padilla v Kentucky, defense counsel bears a
great responsibility to the noncitizen defendant.
The primary concern of this Article is on the representation of
noncitizen, lawful, permanent residents or refugees who would face re-
moval if they were found guilty of pending charges. The focus is not on
undocumented immigrants or nonimmigrants-e.g., tourists or foreign
students-who could be removed or found inadmissible for future entry
if found guilty of the charges. Many of the strategies discussed here
might be helpful to the latter groups as well, however, undocumented
immigrants and nonimmigrants might face removal on other grounds,
such as overstaying their nonimmigrant visas, working without authori-
zation, or crossing the border without inspection.
I. BACKGROUND ON CRIMINAL GROUNDS OF REMOVAL
The criminal grounds of removal have continued to grow through
the years as Congress increasingly relies on deportation to punish those
who acquire criminal records after admission. Most of these require a
conviction. The criminal deportability grounds apply to crimes involving
moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, aggravated felonies, high-
speed flight, sex offender convictions, controlled substance and firearms
convictions, and domestic violence convictions.
A. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
A noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
(CIMT) that was committed within five years after the date of admission
is deportable if the crime is one for which a sentence of one year or long-
er may be imposed.'5 A similar provision makes a noncitizen inadmissi-
ble, although the deportability ground is more stringent; it focuses on the
possible sentence rather than the actual sentence in determining a noncit-
13. Id. at 369.
14. Castro-O'Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1987).
15. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2015). The statute
states that for those who obtained permanent residence through S visas, a CIMT conviction will
trigger deportation if committed ten years after admission. Id.
838 [Vol. 92:4
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izen's deportability.1 Even if a noncitizen is actually sentenced to less
than one year, the noncitizen is still deportable under this provision for a
crime involving moral turpitude if the offense carries a possible term of
one year or more.17
The CIMT provision states that the crime must have been commit-
ted within five years after the date of admission.'8 The Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized admission under INA § 101(a)(13)(A) for the purposes of a
crime of moral turpitude as the prior "lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration of-
ficer."'9 Admission, therefore, is a key factor in determining the relevant
time period for deportability.
The term "moral turpitude" has never been legislatively defined.
The Supreme Court held that the term was not unconstitutionally vague
in a case involving the deportation of a noncitizen for criminal convic-
20
tions involving fraud. In Jordan v. De George, the Court was asked to
decide whether the term moral turpitude was unconstitutionally vague in
a case involving the crime of conspiracy to defraud the United States of
taxes on distilled spirits.2 1 That particular crime, the Court held, was
squarely within the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude,
"[w]hatever else the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' may mean
in peripheral cases."2 2 Since then, courts have consistently defined moral
turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in gen-
eral, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty be-
tween man and man."23 Extensive case law has been developed around
what constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Crimes that have been held
to involve moral turpitude include murder, voluntary manslaughter, kid-
napping, aggravated assault, rape, fraud, forgery, robbery, petty theft,
grand theft, burglary, perjury, counterfeiting, bribery, willful tax evasion,
and extortion.24 In one case, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
found that the noncitizen's involuntary manslaughter conviction for reck-
16. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) ("[An alien who] is convicted of a crime for which a sen-
tence of one year or longer may be imposed[] is deportable.").
17. Id.
18. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(1).
19. Shivaraman v. Ascheroft, 360 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Immigration and
Nationality Act § 103(a)( 3)(A)).
20. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
21. Id at 226.
22. Id at 232.
23. E.g., Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 420 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11 th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mar-
ciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting In re Henry, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho
1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063,
1068 (9th Cir. 2007).
24. See, e.g., 6 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD
Y. wADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §71.05 (1988); NORTON TOOBY, J.J. ROLLIN & J.
FOSTER, CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE (2008).
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lessly causing the death of her child involved moral turpitude because the
criminal statute required conscious disregard of a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk to the life or safety of others.25 Just as importantly, of course,
the list of offenses that have been held not to involve moral turpitude is
vital, such as simple assault, joy riding, possession of burglary tools, and
breaking and entering without intent to commit a moral turpitude of-
fense.2 6 Vandalism generally is not regarded as a crime involving moral
turpitude.27
Under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), a noncitizen who, any time after ad-
mission, commits two or more crimes involving moral turpitude is de-
portable.28 There is an exception for multiple offenses arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA has interpreted the sin-
gle-scheme provision to cover separate and istinct crimes performed in
furtherance of a single criminal episode, lesser included offenses, and
instances where two crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of
a single act of criminal misconduct.29 The Ninth Circuit has rejected this
approach, noting that the statute refers to a single "scheme" rather than a
single act.30 In the Ninth Circuit, a single scheme includes two or more
crimes that "were planned at the same time and executed in accordance
with that plan."31
B. Aggravated Felonies
In 1988, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (Drug Kingpin Act) created a
new deportation category for a conviction of a single "aggravated felo-
ny" that included murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. 32
Now, aliens-including longtime, lawful permanent residents-
convicted of a single aggravated felony at any time after admission are
deportable.33 The new aggravated felony ground for deportation over-
lapped with other grounds of deportation. For example, drug convictions
that were now aggravated felonies remained independent grounds for
deportation under the provision pertaining to drug crimes.34 Similarly,
any person who was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude
25. Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1995).
26. What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of§ 212(a)(9) and
241(a)(4) oflmmigration and Nationality Act (8 USC.A. § 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar
Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation ofAliens Convicted ofSuch Crime, 23
A.L.R. FED. 480, §§ 2(a), 11(b) (1975).
27. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
28. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2015).
29. Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506, 509 (B.I.A. 1992).
30. Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1990).
31. Id. at 616.
32. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7344(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4470-71
(1988).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see id. § 1101(a)(3) (defining the term "alien").
34. INA §§ 101(a)(43); 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 237(a)(2)(B).
840 [Vol. 92:4
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was still deportable, irrespective of whether one or both crimes were
aggravated felonies.35
The major effect of the introduction of the aggravated felony
ground of deportation was that now a person with a single, non-drug
conviction was deportable, irrespective of time of entry-just as had
been true of single drug convictions prior to 1988.36 For example, a per-
son convicted of murder committed more than five years after entering
the country was now deportable as an aggravated felon. That was not
possible prior to 1988. The problem is that the list of aggravated felonies
for deportation purposes includes much more than murder.
The list of aggravated felonies, expanded several times since
1988,37 is so broad that the current president of the National Association
of Immigration Judges considers the category a "misnomer that includes
many offenses that are neither aggravated nor felonies."38 Today, the
term includes murder, rape, and illicit trafficking of a controlled sub-
stance.39 But theft offenses, when the term of imprisonment is at least
one year, also are included.4 0 So what one might regard as minor
crimes-for example, selling $10 worth of marijuana or "smuggling" a
baby sister across the border illegally-are aggravated felonies for de-
41portation purposes.
A crime classified as a misdemeanor under state law might be re-
garded as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. For example, several offenses are classified as aggravated felonies
once a one-year sentence is imposed. These include theft, burglary, per-
jury, and obstruction of justice, even though the state criminal court may
35. INA §§ 101(a)(43); 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii).
36. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
37. See infra note 39.
38. Dana Leigh Marks, Let Immigration Judges be Judges, THE HILL (May 9, 2013, 8:03
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/298875-let-immigration-judges-be-judges.
39. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (2015). Aggravated felo-
nies include sexual abuse of a minor, any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance (including
possession for sale of marijuana, firearms, or destructive devices), money laundering, or any crime
of violence (except for purely political offenses) for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at
least one year. Id. The definition also includes treason; child pornography; operation of a prostitution
business; fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; tax evasion in
which the loss to the U.S. government exceeds $10,000; crimes relating to the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, if the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year;
alien smuggling, except in the case of a first offense involving the assisting, abetting, or aiding of the
alien's spouse, child, or parent and no other individual; document trafficking, if the term of impris-
onment imposed is at least one year; failure to appear to serve a sentence, if the underlying offense is
punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years; and bribery, counterfeiting, or forgery for
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. Id. An attempt or conspiracy to commit any of
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classify the crime as a misdemeanor.42 Misdemeanor statutory rape, con-
sensual sex where one person is under the age of eighteen, also will be
treated as an aggravated felony.43 Similarly, a misdemeanor conviction
can be an aggravated felony for deportation under the "rape" or "sexual
abuse of a minor" categories.4
In spite of the creation of the aggravated felony ground of deporta-
tion in 1988 and the subsequent expansion of the term, until 1996, a
long-term, lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony
remained eligible to apply for discretionary Section 212(c) relief.4 5 The
deportation respondent's ability to introduce evidence of remorse, reha-
bilitation, hardship to family, work ethic, and community engagement
before the immigration court remained constant.46
The introduction of the aggravated felony concept in 1988 signaled
a major shift in focusing on criminal immigrants. The Immigration Act
of 1990 foreclosed criminal sentencing judges from making a Judicial
Recommendation Against Deportation.47 The Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 and Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 added to the list of aggravated felonies and cre-
ated "administrative" deportation with no hearing before an immigration
judge, while the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996 required mandatory detention of certain criminal al-
iens and barred relief for aggravated felons, drug offenders, and double
moral turpitude defendants.4 8
While deporting criminals might be viewed simply as an effort to
rid the country of immigrants who pose public safety concerns; in fact,
an important purpose of the strengthened penalties was over allocation of
resources in the prison system.49 One-fourth of federal detainees in 1995
were aliens who were taking up precious and costly prison space.50 But
42. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1999); American Immigra-
tion Council, Aggravated Felonies. An Overview, available at:
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-overview
43. William J. Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors Are Felonies: The Aggravated Felony of
Sexual Abuse ofa Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 434-38 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Small, 23 1. & N. Dec. 448, 449 (B.I.A. 2002).
45. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
46. Id; C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A. 1998).
47. Lisa R. Fine, Preventing Miscarriages ofJustice: Reinstating the Use of "Judicial Rec-
ommendations Against Deportation," 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 491, 506-07 (1998); see also Carl
Shusterman, Padilla - Bring Back the JRAD?, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Apr. 18, 2010),
http://shusterman.typepad.com/nation-of-immigrants/2010/04/padilla-bring-back-the-jrad.html.
48. Katherine Brady, Recent Developments in the Immigration Consequences of Crimes, in
OUR STATE OUR ISSUES: AN OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW ISSUES 129 n.1 (Bill Ong Hing ed.,
1996); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 114 (1998).
49. Fine, supra note 45, at 492.
50. Id. at 492-93.
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without a doubt, clamping down on criminal aliens was about removing
aliens who were perceived as undeserving of residence.
Within months of the passage of AEDPA, Congress considered fur-
ther enforcement-focused immigration legislation. Proponents of the
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
continued to voice concern over resource allocations.52 Fresh on the heels
of the 1996 welfare refonn act-the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act-that placed limitations on public assis-
tance for immigrants,53 IIRIRA contained further limits on such bene-
fits. 54 "As a consequence of these laws, with limited excep-
tions, undocumented migrants became ineligible for all federal public
benefits, including loans, licenses, food and housing assistance, and post-
secondary education."55
However, the IIRIRA debates focused heavily on the idea of immi-
grant criminality by increasing categories of deportation and "streamlin-
ing the removal process."56 Prominent Republican Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-UT) argued, "We can no longer afford to allow our borders to be just
overrun by illegal aliens. . . . Frankly, a lot of our criminality in this
country today happens to be coming from criminal, illegal aliens who are
ripping our country apart. A lot of the drugs are coming from these peo-
ple."5 This conflation of "illegal alien" with pervasive crime was suffi-
cient to affect the treatment of all criminal aliens-even those who were
in fact long-term, lawful permanent residents-leading to restrictions on
deportation relief for aggravated felons regardless of immigration sta-
tus.58
As a result, IIRIRA eliminated Section 212(c)'s second-chance re-
lief as it had been applied for twenty years. In its place, a cancellation of
removal provision was added that precluded the possibility of relief for
many who had been able to seek discretionary relief from an immigration
judge under the prior provision.59 The new provision, INA § 240A(a),
permits the Attorney General to "cancel removal" only for certain aliens
who commit crimes if the alien (1) has been a lawful permanent resident
for at least five years, "(2) has resided in the United States continuously
51. Id. at 493.
52. Fine, supra note 45, at 492-93.
53. See generally Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immi-
grant Stories and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1998).
54. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CoNN. L. REV. 1827, 1842 (2007).
55. Id. (footnote omitted).
56. Id at 1843.
57. Id (alteration in original) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S 11,505 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
58. See id at 1839.
59. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187,
repealed by Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
304(b), I10 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996); see also Brady, supra note 48, at 129-30.
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for seven years after having been admitted in any status," and, most sig-
nificantly, "(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." 6 0 The
aggravated felony bar, thus, eliminated relief for many lawful resident
aliens who would have been eligible for Section 212(c) relief.61 The ag-
gravated felony category, that began as additional grounds for crime-
based deportation, became a convenient marker for who should not be
eligible for discretionary relief.
The effect of eliminating Section 212(c) relief for a long-time, law-
ful permanent resident who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
is evident. The weighing and balancing of equities against the serious-
ness of the crime does not take place in the removal proceeding because
the immigration judge does not have discretion to grant relief. Hardship
to the respondent and to his or her family is rendered irrelevant, as is any
evidence of rehabilitation, remorse, or atonement on the part of the re-
spondent. In essence, a single bad act that may have taken "fifteen
minutes" to commit can control the outcome, while the rest of the per-
son's life that could be exemplary and crime free is ignored. 62
C. Controlled Substances, Firearms, Domestic Violence, and Other
Crimes
In addition to the general CIMT and aggravated felony provisions,
the statute names specific crimes that make a noncitizen deportable.63
These provisions are far-reaching in their scope and effect, and they re-
flect a congressional purpose to regulate the activities of noncitizens
even after admission.
60. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
61. The 1996 amendments also expanded the list of crimes included as aggravated felonies.
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78. For example, a crime of theft for which the
person received a one-year sentence was now an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. §
I l01(a)(43)(G). Previously, a theft crime was only classified as an "aggravated felony" if the indi-
vidual received a sentence of five or more years. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Correc-
tions Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4321 (amended 1996). Although
such a crime would have been considered a "crime involving moral turpitude," it would not have
been grounds for instituting deportation unless it was committed within the first five years or was
accompanied by a second crime of moral turpitude. Brady, supra note 48, at 144-45. Once the immi-
grant is classified as an aggravated felon, other harsh immigration consequences follow. An aggra-
vated felon is ineligible for release on bond and asylum (although the person might be eligible for
"restriction of removal" or the protections of the Convention Against Torture). BILL ONG HING,
DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 58 (2006). An aggravated
felon who is not a lawful permanent resident can be deported without a hearing before an immigra-
tion judge and is not eligible for a waiver for moral turpitude offenses upon admission. Aggravated
Felonies: An Overview, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-overview. To make matters worse,
a deported aggravated felon who returns to the United States illegally can be sentenced up to twenty
years in federal prison. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
62. CITY & CNTY OF S.F. IMMIGRANT RIGHTS COMM'N, A CITY AND NATION OF
IMMIGRANTS: 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 78 (2013)
(testimony of Anoop Prasad, staff attorney) (on file with author).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43).
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A noncitizen who at any time after admission has been convicted of
any state, federal, or foreign country law related to controlled substances,
other than possession for personal use of thirty grams or less of marijua-
na, is deportable.4 The statute covers convictions for conspiracy or at-
tempt as well as direct convictions.65 The statute also makes a noncitizen
who at any time after admission becomes a drug abuser or addict deport-
able.66 This provision is triggered simply by behavior rather than a con-
viction.
Just as broad in its application is the provision that makes convic-
tion of a firearms offense after admission a deportable offense. The stat-
ute states that "[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted
under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, us-
ing, owning, possessing, or carrying . . . any weapon, part, or accessory
which is a firearm . .. in violation of any law is deportable."6 7 This pro-
vision also covers conspiracy and attempt offenses.68
Probably the most far-reaching criminal deportability ground is the
domestic violence ground. A noncitizen convicted of any domestic vio-
lence offense at any time after admission is deportable.69 Domestic vio-
lence offenses include domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse-
neglect or abandonment.70 Moreover, the statute makes anyone deporta-
ble who violates a protection order, whether civil or criminal, when in-
volving threats of violence.
The statute enumerates several other offenses for which conviction
makes a noncitizen deportable, including failure to register as a sex of-
fender;72 high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint;" crimes
related to espionage, treason, and sedition;74 and certain violations of the
Trading with the Enemy Act or the Military Selective Service Act.75
Note that some grounds of removal that are criminal-related do not
require convictions. A drug abuser or addict is deportable even without a
conviction.76 A noncitizen who has aided, assisted, or encouraged noncit-
izens to cross the border illegally is deportable.77 A noncitizen is deport-
able who is found by a civil or criminal judge to have violated portions
64. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
67. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
68. Id.
69. Id § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
72. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).
73. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv).
74. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i).
75. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iii).
76. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
77. Id. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i).
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of a domestic violence protective order relating to threat, violence, or
repeated harassment.78
II. CLIENTS WHO ARE UNAWARE OF THEIR U.S. CITIZENSHIP
Before proceeding to criminal justice system defense strategies, a
preliminary step needs to occur. At some point early in the representation
of a noncitizen in the criminal phase and certainly in the deportation
phase, counsel needs to verify that for sure the client is in fact a nonciti-
zen. Removal laws only apply to aliens. Thus, U.S. citizenship can be
regarded as a "complete bar to removal" from the United States.7 ' As
unbelievable as it may seem, some individuals may be unaware of the
fact that they have derived U.S. citizenship from a parent. Consider this
example:
Douglas Centeno, 31, was released from an immigration jail in April
after a Chronicle story attracted fresh attention from immigration of-
ficials to his case. Now the government has abandoned its efforts to
deport Centeno, accepting the evidence that he is, in fact, a U.S. citi-
zen.
Centeno's case is the latest example of an increasingly common
problem, legal experts say: People wind up in immigration detention
for months, or years, trying to assemble evidence to show that they
don't belong there in the first place.
Citizenship is one of the most complex areas of law . . . . Some peo-
ple born abroad inherit U.S. citizenship from a parent or grandparent;
others gain it as children if their parents naturalize. Sometimes that
citizenship is difficult to trace or document.
That was what happened for Centeno, according to his attorney, Sin
Yen Ling of San Francisco's Asian Law Caucus. Born in Nicaragua,
Centeno arrived in the United States legally as a 2-year-old. When he
was 16, his father became a naturalized U.S. citizen, and Centeno au-
tomatically derived citizenship as well, though he never obtained a
naturalization certificate to prove it.
Legal immigrants who have been convicted of certain crimes face
deportation; citizens do not. And in recent years, local law enforce-
ment agencies have increased their cooperation with immigration of-
ficials, handing over potentially deportable aliens.
78. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
79. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., IMMIGRATION RELIEF TOOLKIT FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENDERS 8 (2014), available at
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/natlrelief-toolkit jan_2014_finalO.pdf.
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Centeno landed in the custody of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement agents in December after serving time for assaulting an of-
ficer.
Centeno, who suffers from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, was
walking down the street talking to himself when police stopped him
.... Centeno asked police to take him to a mental health center, and
when he was refused, he had a psychotic episode and struck [an of-
ficer].
"Unfortunately, it snowballed into him being put in deportation pro-
ceedings," said Ling. "It was a huge mishandling of someone with
mental health problems."
Centeno was locked up for four months....
... [Immigration] Judge Lawrence DiCostanzo ended the deportation
case, noting that the evidence appears to show that Centeno is a citi-
zen.
"It's a great ending for Douglas," said Ling. "But the consequence of
this broken system is that it wrongfully deports U.S. citizens.,,80
One might think that federal immigration officials would screen for
whether someone they have taken into custody is actually a U.S. citizen.
However, that would be wrong. "If it's not clear whether you are an im-
migrant or a citizen, the system is set up to detain you. . . . The default is,
you are an alien, and then from a remote detention facility you have the
burden . . . .81 Even when the person in custody asserts citizenship and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials could have con-
firmed citizenship with reasonable efforts, deportation might still occur.
Nearly three months after U.S. immigration officials dumped Luis
Alberto Delgado in Mexico despite his insistence that he is a U.S. cit-
izen, the 19-year-old was permitted to re-enter the country last week-
end with the U.S. government's blessing.
Delgado said U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents cleared him
to return to the United States on Friday, roughly 85 days after he was
detained by immigration officials and pressured to sign papers that
cleared the way for his removal to Mexico.
Steven Cribby, a spokesman for U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
declined to comment on Delgado's case.
80. Tyche Hendricks, Modesto Man Won't Be Deported, Citizenship OKd, Hous. CHRONICLE
(May 21, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Modesto-man-won-t-be-deported-
citizenship-OKd-3232299.php.
81. Id. (quoting Holly Cooper, a professor at the UC Davis School of Law) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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On Monday in Houston, Delgado said he was pondering a lawsuit
against the U.S. government, calling his case "an injustice."
U.S. Border Patrol agents detained Delgado after a traffic stop in
South Texas on June 17 and held him for eight hours, questioning
him about his citizenship.
Delgado said he gave immigration agents a copy of his birth certifi-
cate showing he was born at Houston's Ben Taub Hospital, a state of
Texas identification card and a Social Security card.
But Delgado, who was raised in Mexico after his parents divorced,
said immigration agents were suspicious of him because he did not
speak English well, and insisted the paperwork he carried belonged
to someone else.
Delgado said he eventually signed paperwork that resulted in his re-
moval to Mexico because he wanted to be released from immigration
custody, and thought he could fight his case from Houston.
"I believe (the agents) discriminated against me because I didn't
speak English," he said. "If you don't speak very well, I think they
just assume you're Mexican."
Isaias Torres, a Houston immigration attorney who took Delgado's
case pro bono, said he believes the U.S. government was "at best,
very negligent" in its handling of the case.
U.S. immigration officials have faced scrutiny in recent years over al-
legations that they have deported U.S. citizens, including a high-
profile case of a mentally disabled Los Angeles man who was lost for
months in Mexico in 2007.
Estimates of the number of U.S. citizens deported from the U.S. vary
widely, and such statistics are not officially tracked by U.S. immigra-
tion officials, who recently adopted guidelines designed to prevent
such deportations.
Torres said the government should not tolerate discrimination against
U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who do not speak English fluent-
ly.
"I don't believe this is an isolated incident," Torres said.
He said such cases will become increasingly common because
the U.S. government is deporting parents with U.S.-bom chil-
dren. . . . Between 1998 and 2007, the United States removed
108,434 illegal immigrants with U.S. citizen children, according to a
2009 Department of Homeland Security report.
Delgado said he does not speak English well because he and his
brother moved to Mexico with their mother after she divorced their
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father, who lived in Dallas. Delgado moved back to Houston about
three years ago.82
Given the phenomenon of real and potential wrongful deportation of
U.S. citizens, competent counsel must determine when the perceived
"noncitizen" criminal defendant actually is not a citizen. First, the cli-
ent's place of birth needs to be determined. Birth in the United States,
with rare exception-e.g., child of foreign diplomat-confers U.S. citi-
zenship on the person.83 Second, if the client was born outside the United
States, but a parent or grandparent was born in the United States, under
certain circumstances, the client may have acquired U.S. citizenship at
birth. For example, a child born abroad to two U.S. citizen parents ac-
quires citizenship at birth as long as one of the parents had a residence in
84the United States prior to the child's birth. A child born abroad to one
U.S. citizen parent and one alien parent acquires citizenship at birth pro-
vided the U.S. citizen parent was physically present in the United States
at the time of the child's birth."
A third way of becoming a U.S. citizen is through derivation, as in
the Douglas Centeno story. Different rules can apply depending on the
person's date of birth. However, a person born on or after February 28,
1983, automatically becomes a citizen prior to his or her eighteenth
birthday if the following events occur: (a) at least one parent who has
legal and physical custody of the child is a U.S. citizen by birth or natu-
ralization, and (b) the child is a lawful permanent resident.86 Similarly,
an adopted child becomes a U.S. citizen through adoptive parents if the
child was born on or after February 28, 1983and (a) was legally adopted
by a U.S. citizen before age sixteen, and (b) became a lawful permanent
resident and resided in the legal custody of the citizen parent for two
years before age 18.
If the client is in fact a noncitizen, then Padilla v. Kentucky obliga-
tions apply. Going to trial is one option. However, a host of other strate-
gies need to be considered as well.
III. ARGUING THAT THE CRIME Is NOT A REMOVABLE OFFENSE
Occasionally, a conviction can be challenged on the ground that the
crime is not a moral turpitude crime, not an aggravated felony, and not a
82. Susan Carroll, Man Born at Ben Taub Returns after He 's Wrongly Deported, Hous.
CHRONICLE (Sept. 14, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Man-
born-at-Ben-Taub-retums-after-he-s-wrongly- 1694617.php.
83. Birth in Puerto Rico, Guam, and U.S. Virgin Islands also confers U.S. citizenship at birth.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1402, 1406, 1407.See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(child born to parents in the United States who were not eligible for citizenship is a citizen nonethe-
less under the Fourteenth Amendment).
84. Id. § 1401(c).
85. Id. § 1401(g).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a); Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 758-60 (9th Cir. 2001).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 143 1(b).
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narcotics crime-in essence, that the crime is not a removable offense. A
noncitizen generally is not subject to removal based on a criminal con-
viction unless the conviction fits categorically within one of the criminal
removal grounds. This "categorical approach" requires adjudicators to
determine whether all of the conduct covered under the statute of convic-
tion fits within the alleged criminal removal classification.88 If it does
not, the person does not fit within the removal classification. Important-
ly, the immigration judge may not delve into the particular conduct un-
derlying the person's conviction.
The Supreme Court in unequivocal terms has reaffirmed the tradi-
tional categorical approach for determining whether a conviction falls
within a removal classification. In Moncrieffe v. Holder,90 the Court held
that a Georgia conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distrib-
ute may not be deemed a drug trafficking aggravated felony for removal
purposes.9 1 The statute of conviction covered some conduct-social shar-
ing of marijuana-falling outside the aggravated felony drug trafficking
definition.92 Under the categorical approach, the court does not assess the
person's actual conduct; instead the court focuses on the text of the stat-
ute under which the person was convicted.93 If the statute would crimi-
nalize conduct that is not within the federal standard for an aggravated
felony, then the categorical approach is not satisfied and a conviction
under the statute does not render the person an aggravated felon.94
In Descamps v. United States,95 the Supreme Court again empha-
sized the application of the categorical approach where the elements set
forth in the criminal statute must be compared to the immigration law
removal ground.96 The facts in the criminal case are irrelevant. All that
matters are the elements of the statute of conviction. The rationale for an
elements-centric approach, as the Court explained in Descamps, is multi-
fold: it comports with the text and history of the statutes it was created to
apply, it avoids Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sen-
tencing courts making factual findings that belong to juries, and it averts
the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach.9 7
Descamps makes clear that deviation from the categorical approach-
i.e., application of a modified categorical approach-is permitted in only
one scenario: where the relevant criminal statute expressly defines more
88. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2013).
89. Id. at 1684.
90. Id. at 1678.
91. Id. at 1693-94.
92. Id. at 1684-85.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1686-87.
95. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
96. Id at 2281.
97. Id at 2287.
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than one offense.98 In cases involving these statutes-called "divisible"
statutes because they set out one or more of the elements of the offense
in the alternative, e.g., burglary involving entry into a building or an au-
tomobile-courts may consult a limited universe of extra-statutory doc-
uments for the purpose of ascertaining which elements of the statute the
defendant was convicted of.99
The lesson for criminal defense counsel is that as long as a client
can plead guilty to a crime under a nondivisible statute that makes crimi-
nal some conduct that does not fit within the removal classification, that
option is a good one from an immigration perspective. In some circum-
stances, that likely requires very sophisticated knowledge of the applica-
ble criminal statutes. However, defense counsel's effort to reach that
level of understanding is well worth the effort for noncitizen clients.
However, when a divisible statute is involved, knowledgeable de-
fense counsel has an additional set of considerations to make. The Su-
preme Court has recognized a "narrow range of cases" in which sentenc-
ing courts or immigration judges-applying what has come to be known
as the modified categorical approach-may look beyond the statutory
elements to "charging paper and jury instructions" used in a case.m
When a statute with alternative elements, such as a burglary statute that
prohibits entry of an automobile as well as a building, the court permits a
limited review of facts specific to the case.'or
For example, if the burglary of a building constitutes a deportable
offense but burglary of an automobile does not, the court permits this
modified categorical approach. Because the statute is "divisible,"-i.e.,
comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime-a court cannot
tell, without reviewing something more, if the person's conviction was
for the building or automobile form of burglary. So a sentencing or im-
migration court is authorized to scrutinize a restricted set of materials,
such as "the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between
judge and defendant," to determine if the person had pleaded guilty to
entering a building or a car.102 Thus, in the divisible statute situation,
defense counsel representing a noncitizen client have a particular burden
to steer the plea agreement or colloquy transcript in a direction away
from the deportable division of the criminal statute if possible.
Odd language in the federal generic statute can also provide a basis
for an immigration court to look at the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In Nijhawan v. Holder, o0 the government al-
98. Id. at 2292-93.
99. Id at 2281.
100. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
101. Id.
102. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
103. 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
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leged that Mr. Nijhawan's convictions for conspiring to commit mail
fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering constituted aggravated felo-
nies.'0 In defining "aggravated felony," the Immigration and Nationality
Act includes "an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the
loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000."' Mr. Nijhawan argued
that since criminal statutes under which he was convicted did not require
a finding of any particular amount of victim loss, his convictions did not
constitute aggravated felonies.'06 However, the Supreme Court ruled that
the italicized language does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit,
but rather to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed
a fraud or deceit crime on a particular occasion.10 7 As such, the immigra-
tion court could look to the facts and circumstances underlying the con-
viction.s08 At his sentencing, Mr. Nijhawan stipulated that the victim loss
exceeded $100 million and, therefore, his convictions fell within the def-
inition of aggravated felony.109 Again, the Nijhawan holding admonishes
defense counsel to be aware of the particular circumstances that fall into
the classification for removal offenses and use language in sentencing-
related records that avoids removable classifications.0
IV. AVOIDING A CONVICTION
Criminal grounds of removal require a "conviction." So avoiding a
conviction averts deportation on those grounds. Whether a legal disposi-
tion constitutes a conviction for immigration law purposes is determined
under federal standards."' However, some efforts that are commonly
known to defense attorneys can result in a non-conviction and should be
considered.
A conviction occurs for immigration purposes only if there is an
admission or finding of guilt and the judge imposes some form of pun-
ishment or restraint such as jail, probation, restitution, or fines.112 A dis-
position that contains these two elements is a conviction for immigration
purposes, even if the state does not consider the outcome to be a convic-
tion. 1 Because most criminal courts impose requirements or restrictions
on a defendant, the second prong-imposition of punishment or re-
104. Id. at 32-33.
105. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2015) (emphasis
added).
106. Nihawan, 557 U.S. at 35-36.
107. Id. at 32.
108. Id. at 41-43.
109. Id. at 32-33.
110. Id. at 42-43.
111. See, e.g., Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 22 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994), withdrawn and super-
seded on denial ofreh'g, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994); Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. 546, 546, 548 (B.I.A.
1988), superseded by statute as recognized in Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 629
F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2011); Grullon, 20 1. & N. Dec. 12, 12 (B.I.A. 1989).
112. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(48)(A); Cabrera, 24
1. & N. Dec. 459 (B.I.A. 2008).
113. See, e.g., Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2001).
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straint-will only rarely be avoided. However, many dispositions avoid
the first prong of the conviction definition-admission or finding of
guilt. Some dispositions that avoid a conviction for immigration purposes
include acquittal, deferred prosecution, deferred verdict, deferred sen-
tence, and dismissal before conviction under a pre-plea diversion
scheme.
A. Deferred Prosecution or Sentence
Criminal defense attorneys can bargain for an informal deferred
prosecution in which the plea hearing is postponed and the defendant
agrees to meet several conditions during postponement. This must be
done with the understanding that the prosecution may drop or reduce the
charges based on the defendant's good performance. This disposition is
not a conviction because no guilty plea is taken. In the alternative, there
is no conviction if a plea is taken but no sentence is ever imposed.
B. Pre-Plea Drug Court
Some states provide the option of a pre-trial drug court program,
which may not involve a guilty plea. For example, California Penal Code
§ 1000.5 provides for a "pre-guilty plea drug court program."l l4 Under
this program, criminal proceedings are suspended without a plea of
guilty." 5 Consequently, successful completion of the program should not
constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.
Unfortunately, some pre-trial drug court programs may require an
admission of drug abuse or addiction. A drug abuser or addict is deporta-
ble even without a conviction."6 In some cases, therefore, a first convic-
tion of simple possession or less may be preferable to being labeled an
abuser or addict. For example, elimination of a conviction under a state
rehabilitative relief provision eliminates the crime for immigration pur-
poses in the Ninth Circuit, as long as it was a first conviction for simple
possession of a controlled substance."17
C. Other Pre-Plea Diversion Programs
Many states have special pre-plea diversion programs or courts for
such things as misdemeanors, first-time offenders, and domestic vio-
lence. For example, California provides for pretrial diversion without a
guilty plea for some individuals who are charged with misdemeanor of-
fenses or who have mental retardation." Because these dispositions do
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.5 (West 2015).
115. Id. § 1000.5(a).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
117. Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011).
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001; People v. Weatherhill 215 Cal. App. 3d 1571, 1586 (2d Cir.
1989)
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not involve a guilty plea or finding of facts sufficient to support guilt,
they are not regarded as convictions for immigration purposes.
D. Deferred Entry ofJudgment, Expungements, and Other Rehabilitative
Schemes Following a Plea
Many states have some form of rehabilitative program for underage
or first-time offenders, which the state may or may not characterize as a
conviction.119 The state may provide that after a person pleads guilty, as
long as probation or other requirements are satisfied, the court will with-
draw the plea, charges are dropped, and for many state law purposes the
conviction will cease to exist.120 Generally, withdrawal of plea under
these kinds of rehabilitative relief has no effect for immigration purpos-
es.121 The only exception is for a first conviction for certain minor drug
offenses in the Ninth Circuit.122
Unfortunately, convictions that result in alternative placements or
treatments are still convictions for immigration purposes. For example,
many states have enacted laws that require or give discretion to a judge
to sentence an underage or first-time drug offender to treatment rather
than incarceration.123 A person might be placed in a state mental hospital
or treatment facility following a finding of guilt. Minors who are tried
and convicted as adults might be committed to a youth facility. However,
these dispositions do not ameliorate the immigration effect as long as
there has been an admission or finding of guilt that led to a conviction.124
V.VACATION OF JUDGMENT FOR CAUSE
With the exception of the Fifth Circuit, when a court acting within
its jurisdiction vacates a judgment of conviction, the conviction no long-
er constitutes a valid basis for removal.125 Immigration authorities give
119. For example, in Georgia, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 reads: "upon a verdict or plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, but before an adjudication of guilt, the court may, in the case of a defendant who
has not been previously convicted of a felony, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the
consent of the defendant, defer further proceeding and place the defendant on probation as a first
offender." First Offender does not mean that the incident is wiped away or expunged, but it does
mean that it should not appear as a conviction on the defendant's criminal history. See Breakfield
and Associates, Georgia First Offender Act and Treatment of a Ist Offense, Feb. 12, 2011, available
at http://www.gainesvillegalawyer.com/georgia-first-offender-act-and-treatment-of-a- I st-offense/
120. See, e.g., In re Luviano-Rodriguez, 21 1 & N Dec. 235, 237-38 (BIA 1996).
121. See, e.g., Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2001).
122. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749-50. But cf Salazar-Regino, 23 1. & N. Dec. 223,
224, 227-29 (B.I.A. 2002) (discussing the agency's disagreement with the Ninth Circuit rule).
123. See Caren Chesler, New Jersey's Drug Court Program: Making the Sentence Fit the
Crime, NJSPOTLIGHt, Oct. 22, 2013, available at http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/10/22/new-
jersey-s-drug-court-program-making-the-sentence-fit-the-crime/?p=all
124. See, e.g., United States v. Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a
defendant's drug possession, where he was sentenced to probation instead of prison, did not stop him
from being deported); United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2002); L-R-, 8 I.
& N. Dec. 269 (B.I.A. 1959), overruled in part by Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988). Cf
Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2004).
125. Marroquin-Garcia, 23 1. & N. Dec. 705 (U.S. Att'y Gen. 2005); see also Garcia-
Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 291 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he BIA held that convictions vacat-
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"full faith and credit" to the state court action, not questioning the validi-
ty of vacations of judgment under state law.126 Thus, when there has been
a conviction, it makes sense for criminal defense counsel to consider
whether the judgment can be vacated.
The conviction must have been vacated for cause, not merely for
hardship or rehabilitation. A conviction is not eliminated for immigration
purposes if the court vacates the judgment for reasons "solely related to
rehabilitation or immigration hardships, rather than on the basis of a pro-
cedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings."27
Except in the Sixth Circuit, the immigrant has the burden to show that
the conviction was vacated for procedural or substantive, rather than
rehabilitative, reasons.128
VI. PARDON
Seeking a gubernatorial or presidential pardon can eliminate some
convictions for deportation purposes. A "full and unconditional pardon"
by the President of the United States or the governor of the state will
prevent removal for a conviction involving moral turpitude, an aggravat-
ed felony, or high-speed flight near a border.129 A pardon is ineffective
for other grounds, for example the domestic violence or firearms grounds
of deportation, even if the conviction also is a crime involving moral
turpitude or aggravated felony.' 30
VII. PLEA BARGAINING TO AVOID DEPORTABLE OFFENSES
Given the basic framework for criminal deportation classifications
of moral turpitude, drug offenses, firearms, and aggravated felonies,
competent criminal defense attorneys can avert the possibility of removal
at the plea bargain stage. If the prosecutor is willing to accept a guilty
plea for a charge that does not result in a deportable offense, the client
has been provided a great service. The informed client may even be will-
ing to accept more incarceration time in order to avoid conviction of a
removable offense.
Seeking a deal at the plea bargaining stage to avoid a deportable of-
fense requires defense counsel to be aware of the viable non-removable
ed on the basis of procedural and substantive defects were not valid for purposes of immigration,
while those vacated because of post-conviction events such as rehabilitation were to be given effect
in immigration proceedings. This may be the stance of our sister circuits, but is not the law in this
circuit.") (citation omitted); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 2002).
126. See Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1378, 1380 (B.I.A. 2000).
127. Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 621 (B.I.A. 2003), rev'd, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d
263 (6th Cir. 2006).
128. See Pickering, 465 F.3d at 269 (holding that the government must show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the petitioner's conviction was "vacated solely for immigration reasons"
in order for him to still be deportable).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2015).
130. Suh, 23 1. & N. Dec. 626, 627 (B.I.A. 2003).
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options to a removable charge. For example, if the client is charged with
a serious property crime that is a crime involving moral turpitude, an
alternate charge of vandalism might be considered. But even then, coun-
sel needs to be aware of how vandalism is regarded in the particular ju-
risdiction. Katherine Brady, a highly regarded criminal immigration ex-
pert offers this admonition on vandalism:
Although the better and most commonly-held view is that [Califor-
nia] PC 594 is not a CIMT, we don't have [a] specific case on that, so
it is possible that the conviction could be held a CIMT. One con-
servative immigration judge in San Francisco held that it is.
The Ninth Circuit held that vandalism is not a CIMT under a Wash-
ington statute that has similar elements to PC 594 except that the
amount of damage had to exceed $250. The court reasoned that since
the minimum damage could be as low as $250, [vandalism] was not a
CIMT because it could essentially be a prank. See Rodriguez-Herrera
v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995) ("In contrast to the bulk of other
non-fraud crimes necessarily involving moral turpitude, malicious
mischief is a relatively minor offense. Indeed, one can be convicted
of malicious mischief for destroying as little as $250.00 of another's
property with an evil wish to annoy.") The difference between $250
and $400 ought not to bring it into moral turpitude.
The BIA found that felony PC 594 with a gang enhancement pursu-
ant to PC 186.22(d), is a CIMT. This is based on the fact that the
gang enhancement elements, which must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, are included in the elements of the offense and they re-
quire an intent greater than to "annoy." Matter of Hernandez, 26 1&N
Dec. 397 (BIA 2014) ("The California Legislature required that the
underlying crime be committed with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist the criminal conduct of a street gang to make it
"clear that a criminal offense is subject to increased punishment un-
der the STEP Act only if the crime is 'gang related,"' given that not
all crimes committed by gang members are related to a gang. People
v. Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1071 (quoting People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d
713, 724 (Cal. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is only
when a defendant's intentional acts are "combined with his
knowledge that those acts would assist crimes by fellow gang mem-
bers" that there is sufficient evidence of the requisite specific intent
to support a gang enhancement. People v. Morales, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d
615, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Thus, to be convicted of felony van-
dalism with a gang enhancement, the offender must have been found
beyond a reasonable doubt to have had a malicious or evil intent in
committing vandalism for the benefit of a criminal street gang and to
856 [Vol. 92:4
2015] DEFENSE COUNSEL STRATEGIES AFTER PADILLA
have done so with the specific intent to promote criminal activity by
gang members.").1
This relatively simple example underscores the pressure on criminal
defense counsel to be up on the immigration effects of certain crimes.
A. Plea Bargaining and Sentencing
Sentencing is an area in which criminal defense counsel can exert
significant control over immigration consequences. Often, the immigra-
tion question focuses on the amount of sentence imposed.132 For instance,
obtaining a sentence of less than one year imprisonment can prevent
many offenses from being classified as aggravated felonies.133 A sen-
tence of not more than six months imposed for a first misdemeanor con-
viction of an offense involving moral turpitude will qualify the nonciti-
zen for the petty offense exception to the inadmissibility ground.1
34
For immigration purposes, a sentence is "deemed to include the pe-
riod of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless
of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or
sentence in whole or in part." 35 For example, when the imposition of
sentence is suspended, and custody-i.e., jail time-is ordered as a con-
dition of probation, the sentence is the amount of custody time ordered,
regardless of the fact that technically no sentence was "imposed."
1 36
When the sentence is imposed and all or part of the execution of the sen-
tence is suspended, the entire sentence imposed is the sentence for immi-
gration purposes, regardless of the fact that the defendant will not serve
all or part of the sentence.'37 Probation alone is never a sentence to con-
finement, although if the judge orders the noncitizen to spend time in jail
as a condition of probation, the time ordered is a sentence.
3 1
The sentencing issue should be kept in mind in the post-conviction
context as well. Counsel pursuing post-conviction relief may find it easi-
er to persuade authorities to vacate or reduce a sentence than to vacate
the entire conviction. After that, the judge can impose a new sentence
that can avert the immigration consequence. Implicit in this and other
situations discussed in this section is the requirement that defense coun-
131. E-mail from Katherine Brady, Senior Staff Attorney, Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., to author
(Feb. 8, 2015) (on file with author).
132. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(B).
133. E.g. id. § I 101(a)(43)(G) (defining theft and burglary as an aggravated felony only if "the
term of imprisonment (is] at least one year").
134. Petty Offense Exception, LAW OFFICES OF NORTON TOOBY,
http://nortontooby.com/topics/petty offense exception (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
135. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(B).
136. United States v. Alvarez-Hemandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007).
137. See Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
138. See, e.g., De La Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1976); Matter of F, I I. & N. Dec. 343
(B.I.A. 1942).
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sel becomes very familiar with the range of related criminal charges and
associated sentencing possibilities.
A sentencing deal can make a difference in a misdemeanor situation
as well. Noncitizens are deportable for one conviction of a moral turpi-
tude offense committed within five years of admission if the offense has
a maximum possible sentence of one year or more.'39 So a conviction of
a misdemeanor with a potential sentence of a year can cause deportabil-
ity under this ground because the offense carries a maximum possible
sentence of a year.140 Defense counsel should attempt to plead to a non-
turpitudinous offense in any situation, for example, by taking an in-
creased time in jail, waiving credit for time served, or waiving good-time
credits. However, if the client is facing the first possible conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude, then counsel should try to plea to a
crime where the maximum possible sentence is less than one year.
Several offenses are regarded as aggravated felonies only if a sen-
tence of a year or more was imposed for the conviction.14 1 These include
convictions for such things as crimes of violence, theft, burglary, bribery,
document fraud, counterfeiting, forgery, obstruction of justice, and per-
jury.142 Avoiding the aggravated felony bar to potential discretionary
relief is important for lawful permanent residents, even if the conviction
is regarded as a moral turpitude crime.143
When a criminal court judge modifies a sentence, the modification
can avert immigration consequences.144 This is true even if the basis for
the sentence motion is not legal error but merely a need to avoid immi-
gration consequences.145 This contrasts with the vacation of judgment
situation.146 Similarly, during probation a court can modify the terms of
probation for any reason, including reducing custody imposed as a condi-
tion of probation to less than 365 days due to immigration concerns and
affect the immigration outcome. 147
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
140. In California, for example, this could arise in a "wobbler" situation when an offense could
be treated as either a felony or misdemeanor and the prosecutor offers to reduce the crime to a mis-
demeanor. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 2011) (stating that the same type of offense may be
prosecuted as a felony or a misdemeanor); People v. Staturm, 50 P.3d 355, 356-57 (Cal. 2002) (de-
scribing an example of a "wobbler" crime).
141. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43).
142. Id. § 101(a)(43)(F), (G), (P), (R), (S).
143. A person who has been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years, has resided
continuously in the United States for seven years, and has not been convicted of an aggravated
felony can apply for discretionary cancellation of removal before an immigration judge.
Id. § 1229b(a).
144. See Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849, 852-53 (B.I.A. 2005).
145. See id at 850. In this case, a judge granted a motion to reduce a sentence to 364 days in
response to counsel's argument that this would prevent the conviction from being an aggravated
felony, enabling the lawful permanent resident defendant to apply for cancellation of removal. Id
146. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
147. See Coto-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 850-51; see also People v. Segura, 188 P.3d 649
(Cal. 2008) (trial court's statutory authority to modify conditions of probation in the exercise of its
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B. Firearms Cases
The firearms offense ground of deportation provides a good exam-
ple of the importance of considering potential alternate pleas to avoid
removal. The law provides a broad firearms ground of deportation. A
noncitizen is deportable "who at any time after admission is convicted
under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, us-
ing, owning, possessing, or carrying . . . any . . . firearm or destructive
device . . . in violation of any law."1 4 8 This removal ground includes
convictions of pure firearms offenses as well as firearms offenses com-
mitted in connection with other crimes.149
Given the breadth of this ground of deportation, defense counsel
might be wise to consider these options on behalf of clients facing fire-
arms charges.
Solicitation. A conviction for solicitation to commit a firearms
crime arguably is not a trigger to deportation under the firearms ground.
Since the deportation ground does not mention solicitation, which is a
distinct offense, solicitation to commit a firearms crime should be fine. 150
Accessory after the fact. An accessory after the fact is one who,
knowing that a felony has been committed, "harbors, conceals, or aids a
principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment."s15  The offense can
be punished as a misdemeanor or felony, but the offense does not take on
the character of the principal offense.152 The accessory after the fact to a
firearms offense will not be held to have committed a deportable fire-
arms offense.153 The BIA, however, has found that accessory after the
fact is obstruction of justice and can be regarded as an aggravated felony
if a sentence of a year or more is imposed.154
Divisible statutes. If a statute is divisible containing firearms and
non-firearms offenses, then counsel should make every effort to keep the
record of conviction clear of information that a firearm was used. Some
statutes target possession of a weapon with subdivisions indicating
whether the weapon is a gun, knife, machete, or something else.'5 ' Those
jurisdiction over a probationer did not, however, extend to modifying a material term of a plea
agreement hat bestowed the privilege of probation subject to defendant's service of a specified jail
term).
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
149. See, e.g., Valerio-Ochoa v. INS, 241 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001).
150. Cf Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that solicita-
tion of a controlled substance is distinct and not on the list of deportable offenses).
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 2015).
152. See People v. Mouton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 429-431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
153. See Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), overruled
on other grounds by United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011).
154. Batista-Hemandez, 21 1. & N. Dec. 955, 961 (BIA. 1997).
155. See, e.g., Calif. P.C. §§ 245, 12020(a); Pichardo-Sufren, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A.
1996).
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statutes would be regarded as divisible, and an immigration judge can
use a modified categorical analysis in order to determine whether the
specific offense involved firearms.'16 The judge can look beyond the
statute in that situation to certain documents in the record of conviction,
including the indictment, plea, judgment or verdict, sentence, and tran-
script from court proceedings.57 However, the police report, pre-trial
reports, and the noncitizen's own statements outside of the criminal court
hearing cannot be reviewed.' 8
Sporting, recreational, or cultural purposes. The federal definition of
a destructive device that is used in the firearms deportation ground and
aggravated felony categories does not include "a rifle which the owner
intends to use solely for sporting, recreational or cultural purposes."5 9
This definition invites defense counsel to push these limits. The outcome
of such efforts has been mixed. Counsel have not been successful in the
Eighth Circuit in arguing that the cultural exception should apply to gen-
eral firearms charges, even if the exception precludes the weapon from
being classified as a destructive device.160 However, the Seventh Circuit
has held that the definition of destructive device includes firearms, and a
general cultural purpose exception for rifles exists.161
CLOSING
The Supreme Court's message to criminal defense attorneys in Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky was clear: When there is a risk of deportation, defense
counsel has a constitutional duty to inform an immigrant defendant of the
potential for deportation or adverse immigration consequences prior to
pleading guilty. In my view, this constitutional duty places tremendous
pressure on defense counsel to do more than advise, because once ad-
vised, the client very naturally may want to know what options are avail-
able other than going to trial. Rather than simply focusing on how to
minimize the time of incarceration for the client under a particular plea
agreement, counsel has to figure out how to minimize the immigration
ramifications. As I have outlined, the competent efforts range from de-
termining whether the client might actually be a citizen, to seeking a
sentence that would fall outside the realm of an aggravated felony, to
seeking a plea to an alternative charge that does not involve moral turpi-
tude, to making sure that the sentencing plea or colloquy is silent about
certain facts.
156. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
157. Matter of Teixeira, 21 1. & N. Dec. 316 (B.I.A. 1996); see Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
158. See, e.g., Madrigal-Calvo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 323 (B.I.A. 1996).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (2015).
160. Awad v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2007). Cf Valerio-Ochoa v. INS, 241 F.3d
1092 (9th Cir. 2001).
161. Lemus-Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
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These efforts discussed are demanding. They entail resourceful, in-
tricate knowledge of the relevant criminal codes. They also require re-
sourceful, intricate knowledge of the criminal grounds of removal and
up-to-date research on what classifications of convictions can or cannot
lead to removal. In short, this could very well mean that competent de-
fense counsel needs to partner with a competent immigration specialist.
Since Padilla v. Kentucky was decided in 2010, some public de-
fenders' offices across the country have responded with a clear under-
standing of the burden that criminal defense counsel now face. In the San
Francisco Bay Area, the public defender offices in San Francisco, Ala-
meda, and Contra Costa counties have brought on full-time immigration
specialists on their staff. Soon after Padilla, the Brooklyn, New York
public defender office did the same. Some public defender offices con-
tract with immigration experts like the Immigrant Legal Resource Center
for consultations. 62 That all makes sense.
However, at the same time, after reading the Padilla case, one of
my students who interned at a different public defender office in Califor-
nia during the summer of 2014 sent me this troubling reflection:
While working in one of the poorest Public Defender's offices in the
state of California I realized how under-served the immigrant popula-
tion was. The poor public defenders had a caseload of about 300 cas-
es a day which they had to somehow get through. They often did not
have the time to further inquire about a person's immigration status
before pleading them into a deal that will later hurt their immigration
process. Only one attorney actually took his time to inquire about the
immigration status of some of his clients but he often got in trouble
for not finishing his caseload for that day. And when he asked for
better deals because of his clients' immigration status the D.A. would
often not be at all reluctant to give better deals.
But many public defenders pleaded their clients to deals that will lat-
er hurt their immigration process because they were crimes of moral
turpitude. The public defender did not know because he/she didn't
inquire about the client's immigration status and the client didn't
know because he/she didn't know the law. And admitting to a law
enforcement official, including a public defender, a person's immi-
gration status is often not the easiest thing to do.
But aside from lowering the caseload in poor counties . .. I think that
it is imperative that the public defenders serving such a big immi-
grant population be trained in spotting possible immigration issues.
The public defenders in [this county] currently get paid about
162. For example, Vic Eriksen, Felony Team Supervising Attorney in San Diego, said, "I
consider the consulting agreement with the ILRC as one of the best resources available for attorneys
and their clients. I have no idea how we managed without it! Thanks so much." What Our Clients
Say, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/legal-assistance/satisfied-clients (last visited
Apr. 5, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[$]40,000 a year and are worked to the ground. I don't really know
what will be better to hire an immigration attorney or just give all of
them training on immigration issues especially on crimes involving
moral turpitude but something should be done.'63
Something should be done indeed. Because the Constitution re-
quires it. Because deportation "may result . . . in [the] loss of . .. all that
makes life worth living."164 And thus the fate of countless immigrants
facing criminal charges is at stake.
163. E-mail from [2L law student], to author (Feb. 5, 2015) (on file with author).
164. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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